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the Consent Order did not preempt
New York's Lemon Law.
Dissenting Opinion
The dissent noted that under the
Lemon Law the consumer was required to participate in the manufacturer's arbitration procedure,
if any existed. Thus, the Lemon
Law conflicted with the Consent
Order because the Lemon Law
made mandatory the arbitration
established as voluntary under the
Order. Moreover, according to the
dissent, the Better Business Bureau
not only trained its arbitrators to
reach a common sense decision,
but also specifically directed them
not to apply the substantive law of
any particular jurisdiction. Because New York's Lemon Law
required arbitrators to apply Lemon Law standards, it was in conflict
with the FTC-GM Consent Order.
The dissent concluded that this
conflict required a holding that the
Order preempted the Lemon Law.
Sean J. Hardy

HEALTH CARE
INDUSTRY'S
COMPARATIVE
ADVERTISING
CAMPAIGN NOT
ENTITLED TO
HEIGHTENED
CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTION
In U.S. Healthcarev. Blue CrossBlue Shield of GreaterPhiladelphia,
898 F. 2d 914 (3d Cir. 1990), the
United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit held that allegedly defamatory, scare-tactic, multimedia health care advertising was
commercial speech and therefore
was not entitled to heightened protection under the first amendment
to the United States Constitution.
Moreover, although both parties
had invited controversy and had
the means to respond to the other's
advertising, neither was considered a "public figure" and thereI I4AVolume

fore the advertising did not warrant heightened constitutional
protection.
Background: A Comparative
Advertising War
For many years, Blue Cross of
Greater Philadelphia and Pennsylvania's Blue Shield ("Blue CrossBlue Shield") dominated the
health insurance industry in southeastern Pennsylvania; the company offered "traditional" medical
insurance coverage that allowed
the consumer to choose among
hospitals and physicians. A competitor, U.S. Healthcare, offered as
an alternative a health maintenance organization ("HMO"),
both as an insurer and as a direct
provider of medical services. An
HMO offers more comprehensive
services than traditional insurance,
but a primary health care provider
must determine when treatment is
necessary and from whom it may
be obtained. In just over ten years,
U.S. Healthcare grew to 600,000
members; Blue Cross-Blue Shield
membership dropped by over 1%
each year. A majority of those
leaving Blue Cross-Blue Shield
opted for U.S. Healthcare.
Faced with this loss of enrollment, Blue Cross-Blue Shield engaged in an aggressive, $2.175 million multi-media advertising
campaign. In print, radio, television, and direct mail advertisements, Blue Cross-Blue Shield
touted its Personal Choice program and attempted to make less
attractive the HMO option. For
example, several printed advertisements emphasized that a Personal
Choice patient may see a specialist
upon demand, but that an HMO
physician has a disincentive to
make such referrals because "it
could take money directly out of
his pocket."
Most of the Blue Cross-Blue
Shield advertisements contrasted
the features of Personal Choice
and the HMO plan and emphasized that HMO patients had fewer
choices with regard to physicians
and hospitals. The majority of the
advertisements were innocuous.
One television spot, however,
seemed to suggest that HMO membership was an invitation to disas-

ter. The advertisement depicted a
grief-stricken woman stating, "The
hospital my HMO sent me to just
wasn't enough. It's my fault."
U.S. Healthcare responded
quickly by instituting its own aggressive $1.25 million multi-media
advertisement campaign. The advertisements took aim at the Blue
Cross-Blue Shield message that
HMOs sacrificed quality care for
greater profits and highlighted the
fact that Personal Choice doctors
had fewer admitting privileges
than HMO doctors. Two of the
printed advertisements contained
the following headlines, emphasizing that fewer hospitals were available to Personal Choice subscribers: "When It Comes To Being
Admitted To A Hospital, There's
Something Personal Choice May
Not Be Willing To Admit" and "If
You Really Look Into 'Personal
Choice,' You Might Have A Better
Name For It." One of the television commercials played funeral
music while showing a patient's
anguished family members standing around a hospital bed. While a
voice discussed Personal Choice's
various shortcomings, a pair of
hands pulled a sheet up over a
Personal Choice brochure resting
on the pillow of the hospital bed.
U.S. Healthcare called the advertisement "Critical Condition."
Within a week after Blue CrossBlue Shield initiated its advertising
campaign, U.S. Healthcare filed in
a Pennsylvania state court a lawsuit for commercial disparagement, defamation and tortious interference with contractual
relations. At a later date, U.S.
Healthcare re-filed its state claims
in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. In the district court, the
health care organization added a
claim under section 43 (a) of the
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a)
(1982), which creates a cause of
action for any false or misleading
representations of a product. Blue
Cross-Blue Shield filed a counterclaim on essentially the same theories of liability stated in U.S.
Healthcare's complaint.
After a fourteen day trial, the
jury was deadlocked on all issues of
liability and damages. The judge
declared a mistrial and, before
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excusing the jury, asked the jury to
discuss the trial. Upon learning
that the jury was close to unanimity on the counterclaims, the trial
judge requested further deliberations. Eventually, the jury returned
a verdict against Blue Cross-Blue
Shield. Blue Cross-Blue Shield
moved that the judge disregard the
jury's verdict and to direct a judgment in its favor on U.S. Healthcare's claims because Blue CrossBlue Shield's advertisements were
protected by the first amendment
to the United States Constitution.
The district court determined
that the objects of the advertisements were "public figures" and
the advertising debate between the
parties focused on the issue of
spiraling health care costs, a matter
of great public interest. Consequently, the court agreed that
heightened constitutional protection under the first amendment for
commercial speech attached to the
advertisements. Under the heightened evidentiary standard set forth
in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964), for either party to
prevail it would have to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that
the other side's statements were
false and were made with reckless
disregard for the truth. According
to the court, neither U.S. Healthcare nor Blue Cross-Blue Shield
had proven actual malice or falsity
by this standard of proof. Therefore, the district court granted Blue
Cross-Blue Shield's post-trial motion.
Both parties appealed. U.S.
Healthcare appealed the district
court's post-trial entry ofjudgment
in favor of Blue Cross-Blue Shield;
Blue Cross-Blue Shield appealed
from the verdict in favor of U.S.
Healthcare on its counterclaims.
Blue Cross-Blue Shield filed a
counterclaim on essentially the
same theories of liability stated in
U.S. Healthcare's complaint.
United States Court of Appeals:
Which Standards Apply To State
and Federal Claims?
Before addressing the effect of
the first amendment on the burden
of proving liability, the Court of
Appeals determined whether the
statements made in the various
Volume 2, Number 4/Summer, 1990

advertisements were actionable. In
addressing the substantive claims,
the court analyzed each cause of
action to determine whether there
was a material issue of fact such
that the district court erred in
directing a judgment for Blue
Cross-Blue Shield. The court concluded that several of the advertisements were actionable under
both Pennsylvania and federal law.
The Lanham Act. With regard to
the federal claims, the court noted
that the Lanham Act, as recently
amended, prohibits materially
misleading statements about another's products or services. To be
material, there must be either actual deception or at least a tendency
to deceive a substantial number of
people so as to influence their
purchasing decisions. Finally,
there must be a likelihood that the
plaintiff will suffer harm by losing
business or goodwill. The court
stated that "there could be a question" under the Lanham Act as to
whether Blue Cross-Blue Shield
television commercials misrepresented how frequently it paid for
routine check-ups.
Defamation and Disparagement.
As to the defamation and disparagement claims, the court emphasized the distinctiveness of these
two causes of action. Although
similar, they have different objectives. A defamatory statement is
one that tends to harm the reputation of another, resulting in a loss
of esteem in the community or
even outright ostracism. In contrast, commercial disparagement
results when statements attack the
quality of another's goods so as to
make them less marketable. The
court noted that it is sometimes
difficult to determine which of the
two causes of action applies in a
given case, but that disparagement
crosses the line to defamation
when the statement goes beyond
insulting the actual service or product and imputes to the business
entity itself dishonesty or reprehensible conduct.
The court found that a cause of
action for commercial disparagement might lie for the group of
advertisements that compared the
competing plans. On the other
hand, because those advertisements did not impute to the com-

petitor dishonesty or reprehensible
conduct, the defamation claims
failed. The defamation claim did
not fail, however, with regard to
the Blue Cross-Blue Shield advertisements that suggested that HMO
physicians profited from not referring patients to specialists. According to the court, this claim went far
beyond comparing the relative
merits of each plan. Also capable of
a defamatory construction was the
Blue Cross-Blue Shield television
commercial that featured the griefstricken woman who blamed herself for some tragedy because she
had chosen the HMO, and the U.S.
Healthcare spot that visually juxtaposed a death scene with a Blue
Cross-Blue Shield brochure. The
point of both commercial announcements was to insult the
competition rather than to criticize
its products and services.
Tortious Interference with Contract. The court next addressed the
tortious interference with contract
claims. An action for tortious interference with contractual relations may lie if the advertisements
intentionally induce or cause a
third person not to enter into or to
perform a contract with the competition, thereby causing the competitor to suffer economic loss. The
court held that the advertisements
that compared the competing plans
or merely criticized the competitor's plan could have had that
intentional effect.
First Amendment: Lesser Degree
of Protection for Commercial
Speech
Having determined that U.S.
Healthcare had actionable claims,
the court next considered the effect
of the first amendment on the
standard of proof. The court noted
that in evaluating first amendment
interests, a balance must be struck
between protecting individual reputations and safeguarding freedom
of speech, particularly concerning
matters of public interest. Given
the "novel" facts in the case, the
court determined that a somewhat
different approach was required.
Defining "Commercial Speech."
After tracing the development of
American first amendment jurisprudence, the court determined, as
(continued on page 116)
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a threshold issue, whether to characterize as commercial the speech
in question. Commercial speech is
less central to the first amendment
than other forms of speech and
therefore receives less constitutional protection. According to the
court, there was "no question" that
the advertisements were commercial. In applying the factors used to
determine whether particular
speech is commercial, the court
first noted that the advertisements
were part of an expensive marketing strategy to extol one competing
product over another and were
prompted by economic selfinterest. Second, the court concluded that affording the parties'
speech less constitutional protection would not "chill" freedom of
speech. Given the highly competitive nature of the health care industry, an advertising restriction
would not deter the companies
from appropriately touting the relative merits of their products and
services in the future. Moreover,
both U.S. Healthcare and Blue
Cross-Blue Shield were uniquely
situated to verify the truthfulness
of their own statements. Third, the
information disseminated in the
various advertisements added little to the "marketplace of ideas" so
vital to a market economy.
Blue Cross-Blue Shield argued
that even if the speech at issue was
characterized as commercial, it
should be afforded a heightened
degree of protection because the
subject of the advertisementsquality health care-was at the
center of public debate. The court
disagreed and held that advertisers
should not be immunized from
defamation actions merely by
cloaking their objectionable speech
in terms of public interest. Even
though the advertisements concerned the quality and availability
of health care, their primary aim
was to sell a product. Because the
statements were advertisements
"pure and simple," the court concluded that a heightened evidentiary standard should not apply.
"Public" Versus "Private" Figure Protection. Next, the court con116

sidered the nature and weight of
the state's interest in compensating
the parties for injury to reputation.
Blue Cross-Blue Shield argued that
U.S. Healthcare was a "public figure" and therefore the state had a
limited interest in protecting U.S.
Healthcare's reputation. In determining whether the parties were
"public" or "private" figures, two
factors weighed heavily: the parties' access to the media and the
manner in which the risk of defamation came about. With regard to
the first factor, the companies had
the ability to engage in extensive
advertising and therefore lacked
the vulnerability associated with
private citizens. With regard to the
second factor, because of their aggressive advertising, both companies had thrust themselves into a
situation in which they invited
controversy and reaction. Although both of these facts would
support finding that the parties
were "limited purpose public figures," the court concluded that the
companies were not public figures.
Because the parties were motivated by profit rather than a public
figure's desire to resolve an issue of
public debate, the speech did not
warrant the heightened protection
afforded comment on "public figures." Thus, the first amendment
did not require a greater burden of
proof than that required under the
applicable state and federal laws.
As a final matter, the court held
that the trial judge improperly had
reconstituted the deadlocked jury
after declaring a mistrial. The jurors, on the assumption that they
would not be required to deliberate
further, revealed why they were
deadlocked. The court therefore
vacated the jury's subsequent verdict and reinstated Blue CrossBlue Shield's counterclaim.
Eileen B. Libby

BANK THAT
RESTRICTED ITS
CUSTOMERS' CASH
MACHINE PRIVILEGES
WITHOUT PRIOR
NOTICE DID NOT
VIOLATE THE
ELECTRONIC FUND
TRANSFERS ACT
In Feinman v. Bank of Delaware,
728 F. Supp. 1105 (D. Del. 1990),
the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware held
that a bank did not violate the
Electronic Fund Transfers Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1693a-1693r (1988)
("the Act"), when it temporarily
restricted without notification customers' access to their account
through automatic teller machines.
The court also held that although
the bank did violate the Act by
failing to remove the restriction
after the reasons for imposing it no
longer existed, the customers could
not recover damages because they
failed to prove actual injury.
Background
Jeff and Consuela Feinman
("the Feinmans") maintained a
Big Plus Account ("the account")
at the Bank of Delaware ("the
Bank"), which included a checking
and savings account. The Feinmans could make withdrawals, deposits, and other transactions
through automatic teller machines
("ATMs"), commonly known as
cash machines, subject to certain
terms and conditions of the account. The bank included these
conditions in an initial statement
the Feinmans received when they
opened the account. The Feinmans' account also included overdraft protection, which permitted
the bank to transfer funds from the
Feinmans' savings account to their
checking account to cover overdrafts. The Feinmans overdrew
their checking account eight times
in the fourteen months preceding
the incident in question.
On Friday, February 19, 1988,
the Feinmans cashed four checks
and made two ATM withdrawals
resulting in an overdraft of over
Volume 2, Number 4/Summer, 1990

